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MARKEDLY LOW: AN ARGUMENT TO RAISE THE BURDEN OF
PROOF FOR PATENT FALSE MARKING
CAROLINE AYRES TEICHNER*
INTRODUCTION
Under the patent false-marking statute, 35 U.S.C. § 292, any person
may sue whoever marks an unpatented article as patented for the purpose
of deceiving the public, an offense punishable by a maximum fine of
$500.1 Prevailing plaintiffs split this money evenly with the U.S. govern-
ment, thereby making § 292 a qui tam statute.2 Since the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit 3 recently held in Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co.
that the $500 fine under § 292 applies on a per-article basis, the potential
awards for plaintiffs can be enormous, especially where defendants have
mass-produced falsely marked articles.4 For instance, the plaintiff in Pe-
quignot v. Solo Cup Co. claimed that the defendant falsely marked at least
21,757,893,672 cup lids with expired patent numbers in violation of § 292.5
Accordingly, the plaintiff sought to recover $250 per lid, or $5.4 trillion,
which "would be sufficient to pay back 42% of [this] country's total na-
tional debt."6 Although a court would never award such an astronomical
sum of money to any plaintiff, this calculation pointedly illustrates why
patent false-marking suits have captured the attention of businesses, patent
attorneys, and the media in the United States.
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, May 2012; B.S.E. Mechanical & Aerospace
Engineering, Princeton University, 2007. 1 would like to thank Professor David Schwartz for his guid-
ance throughout the research and writing process. Also, many thanks are owed to my family for their
unending support.
1. See 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2006). Part L.B infra presents the text of § 292.
2. See id. § 292(b). Under qui tam statutes, "an individual sues or prosecutes in the name of the
government and shares in the proceeds of any successful litigation or settlement." CHARLES DOYLE,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40785, QUI TAM: THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RELATED FEDERAL
STATUTES 1 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40785.pdf
3. In 1982, Congress passed legislation that created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which primarily hears appeals involving patent law issues that arise in the federal district courts. See
ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JoHtN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 11 (4th ed. 2007).
4. See Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
5. See Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming summary
judgment for defendant because Solo Cup Co. successfully rebutted presumption of intent to deceive
the public).
6. Id. at 1359 n.1.
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Adding to the false-marking frenzy, the Federal Circuit held in Stauf-
fer v. Brooks Brothers, Inc. that a qui tam plaintiff who suffered no person-
al injury as a result of the defendant's false marking nevertheless had
Article III standing to sue under § 292.7 Given the prospect of vast riches
and a relaxed standing requirement, many private individuals and patent
attorneys have gone into the business of suing companies for false mark-
ing.8 These individuals simply wander through retail stores using their
hand-held Internet devices to look up whether the patent numbers stamped
on various products actually cover the products or whether the patent has
expired.9 By October 2010, more than 500 false-marking lawsuits had been
filed that year, with over half of those suits brought by just eight plain-
tiffs.'0 One such individual, deemed "the most prolific false marking plain-
tiff,""1 filed at least twenty-seven complaints in February 2010 alone
alleging false marking against various companies.12 Notably, a majority of
false-marking suits stem from allegations that companies marked their
products with expired patent numbers.13 Oftentimes, the companies in these
cases made their products using expensive-to-replace manufacturing molds
that featured outdated patent information. 14
7. See Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 619 F.3d 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (reasoning that
"[b]ecause the government would have standing to enforce its own law, [the qui tam plaintiff], as the
government's assignee, also has standing to enforce section 292"). In March 2011, a bill was introduced
in the U.S. House of Representatives that proposed changing the current false-marking statute to allow
only those persons "who [have] suffered a competitive injury" to bring suit under § 292(b). H.R. 1249,
112th Cong. § 16(b) (2011). As of early June 2011, there has been no further major progress on the
passage of this bill. In March 2011, the U.S. Senate passed a bill containing similar language, see S. 23,
112th Cong. § 2(k) (2011) (collectively, H.R. 1249 and S. 23 are known as "The America Invents Act
of 2011"), which has since been sent to the House of Representatives.
8. See Joe Mullin, Patent Litigation Weekly: Who is Driving the False-Marking Frenzy?,
LAW.COM (May 31, 2010), http://www.1aw.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202458966077.
9. See Dionne Searcey, New Breed of Patent Claim Bedevils Product Makers, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
1, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI0001424052748703467004575463843289453872.html.
10. See Justin E. Gray, False Marking - Over 500 Suits Filed in 2010; New Bill Proposed to
"Fend Off" Such Suits, GRAY ON CLAIMS (Oct. 20, 2010, 10:52 AM),
http://www.grayonclaims.com/home/2010/10/20/false-marking-over-500-suits-filed-in-201 0-new-bill-
proposed.html.
11. False Marking Plaintiff borrows a page from Simonian in filing its own Amended Complaint,
DOCKET REP. BLOG (June 1, 2010, 4:04 PM), http://docketreport.blogspot.com/2010/06/false-marking-
plaintiff-borrows-page.html [hereinafter False Marking Plaintf] (discussing Thomas Simonian).
12. See False Marking False Marking False Marking False Marking all at up to $500 per offense,
PATENTLY-O BLOG (Feb 26, 2010, 7:17 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/02/false-marking-
false-marking-false-marking-false-marking-all-at-up-to-500-per-
offense.html?cid=6a00d8341c588553ef01 20a8da7bad970b.
13. See Mullin, supra note 8.
14. See, e.g., Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 2010). In Pequignot,
the defendant became aware in 2000 that it was marking its products with a patent number that expired
in 1988. See id. at 1358. However, the expired patent numbers were incorporated into the defendant's
manufacturing mold cavities, which were replaced only once every fifteen to twenty years. See id.
Because it was too expensive for Solo Cup to replace all the mold cavities at the same time, Solo Cup
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Section 292 does not prescribe a burden of proof for false-marking
claims.15 However, in keeping with its liberal treatment of the statute, the
Federal Circuit held that plaintiffs must prove intent to deceive the pub-
lic-the key element of a false-marking claim-by a mere preponderance
of the evidence.16 This note argues that the preponderance standard is an
insufficient burden of proof and that the court should have imposed the
more stringent clear and convincing standard to false-marking claims for
the following reasons. Firstly, a higher burden of proof would effectively
discourage opportunistic qui tam plaintiffs from engaging in the suing-for-
sport behavior spawned by the Federal Circuit's recent rulings about award
calculations and Article III standing under § 292. Secondly, the legislative
history and policy rationales underlying the false-marking statute, plus the
lessons garnered from analogous legal contexts, support this higher burden
of proof. Most importantly, an elevated burden of proof is necessary to
satisfy the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment.
In turn, this note will address the following subject matter: (1) the ge-
nesis of false-marking statutes in America and the policy rationales under-
lying these provisions; (2) the historical cases in which courts offered
divergent interpretations of earlier false-marking statutes; (3) the unsatis-
factory nature of the Federal Circuit's application of the preponderance
standard to § 292; (4) the reasons why justifications for elevated burdens of
proof in analogous legal contexts support a heightened burden for false-
marking claims; and (5) the need for a higher burden of proof to satisfy
constitutional due process requirements.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Historical False-Marking Statutes
Before delving into the modern false-marking statute, it is instructive
to consider the genesis of § 292 and how technological progress-
particularly the rise of the Internet-has affected the intended operation of
the statute.
devised a policy (based on outside counsel's advice) under which the molds would be replaced as
needed due to wear or damage, and the new molds would not include the expired patent numbers. See
id. at 1359. The court thus found that Solo Cup acted in good faith and did not intend to deceive the
public by marking its products with expired patent numbers. See id. at 1364.
15. See 35 U.S.C. § 292.
16. See Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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1. Public Access to Patents over Time
Although the legislative history surrounding earlier false-marking sta-
tutes is silent as to congressional intent for enacting these provisions, one
source identified two "possible influencing factors."' 7 First, in 1836, a fire
at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) destroyed almost 10,000
patent files, thereby depriving the USPTO of complete records in the mid-
nineteenth century, which corresponds to the time Congress passed the first
false-marking statute.18 Second, in the mid-1800s, the public had extremely
limited access to copies of issued patents, given that the USPTO published
mere descriptions of them in a small number of journals printed by the
Franklin Institute of the State of Pennsylvania.19 Therefore, in the nine-
teenth century, the public likely would not have known that an article was
patented unless the patentee had marked it with a patent number. 20 Similar-
ly, the public presumably would have struggled to discern whether an ar-
ticle had been falsely marked.
Yet, the problem of limited public access to issued patents was not
unique to the nineteenth century. In fact, the problem arguably persisted
until widespread Internet access became available. An author writing in
1972 noted the difficulties of obtaining patent information and identifying
falsely marked products: If an article featured a patent number, "the patent
could be ordered and compared with the article"; but, if the article was
labeled only "patented" or "patent pending," one would either have to re-
quest the patent information from the manufacturer, which "would proba-
bly not be successful," or pay for a patent search, which might cost more
than any possible reward under § 292 (before the Bon Tool "per-article"
rule took effect).21
17. Trevor K. Copeland & Laura A. Lydigsen, Qui-tam-osaurus, the Statutory Dinosaur: Evolu-
tion or Extinction for the Qui Tam Patent False Marking Statute?, ENGAGE, Oct. 2009, at 86, available
at http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/pubid.1715/pub detail.asp. See discussion infra Part LD for
policy reasons underlying the false-marking statute.
18. See Copeland & Lydigsen, supra note 17; see also Great Patent Fire of 1836, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/opa/kids/speciaUl1836fire.htm (last
visited Apr. 27, 2011); S. 220, 27th Cong. § 2 (1842) (mentions "patents lost prior to the fifteenth of
December, eighteen hundred and thirty-six," clearly in reference to the USPTO fire).
19. See Copeland & Lydigsen, supra note 17; see also H.R. 102, 30th Cong. § 12 (1848) ("[T]he
Commissioner of Patents be, and he is hereby, authorized to publish monthly in the Journal of the
Franklin Institute of the State of Pennsylvania, a description of all the patents granted at the [U.S. Patent
and Trademark] [O]ffice ... and that the Franklin Institute furnish monthly, twelve hundred and fifty
copies of their Journal.").
20. See Copeland & Lydigsen, supra note 17.
21. Michael 0. Sturm, Does 35 USC 292 Effectively Prevent False Marking?, 54 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 398, 404 (1972).
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Furthermore, in the past, 35 U.S.C. § 122 required the USPTO to keep
all patent applications secret until they issued as patents, making it "practi-
cally impossible" to determine if a patent application covering a given in-
vention had been filed in the United States.22 This changed in 1999 when
Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 122(b), which states that the USPTO shall
publish (with exceptions) patent applications that have been pending for
eighteen months.23 According to the USPTO, most applications filed after
the effective date of § 122(b) will publish within eighteen months of the
filing date.24
Today, the USPTO-among many other providers-offers free, public
access to its patent records via the Internet.25 As a result, it is now much
less burdensome, expensive, and time-consuming to determine whether an
article is covered by a current patent or has been falsely marked. 26 Interes-
tingly though, "[d]espite these dramatic changes to information accessibili-
ty, the current false marking statute is remarkably similar to its antiquated
predecessor[s]." 27 Thus, changes over time in the accessibility of issued
patents-without corresponding changes in the false-marking statute-
have conferred a significant advantage on opportunistic qui tam plaintiffs
today.
2. Nineteenth-Century False-Marking Statutes
Congress first enacted a false-marking statute in 1842. The statute
provided in part that "a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars" would
be imposed on "any person ... [who] shall write, paint, print, mould, cast,
carve, engrave, stamp, or otherwise make or affix the word 'patent,' . . . on
any unpatented article, for the purpose of deceiving the public."28 The sta-
tute also contained a qui tam provision that read, "[O]ne half of [the] penal-
ty, as recovered, shall be paid to the patent fund, and the other half to any
person or persons who shall sue for the same." 29
22. Id. at 405.
23. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2006) (applies to patent applications filed on or after November 29,
2000).
24. See Frequently Asked Questions About Patents, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/faq/patents.jsp#a2 (last modified Dec. 3, 2009).
25. See Search for Patents, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/search/index.jsp (last modified Oct. 13, 2010).
26. Of course, determining conclusively whether a patent covers a given article requires claim
construction, which is arguably difficult and time-consuming. See generally MERGES & DUFFY, supra
note 3, at 781-894.
27. Copeland & Lydigsen, supra note 17; see statutory text infra Parts I.A.2, LB.




In 1870, Congress passed a revised patent and copyright act that in-
cluded a false-marking provision, Rev. St. § 4901, 35 U.S.C. § 50.30 Sec-
tion 4901, which endured until Congress enacted the modem false-marking
statute in 1952, provided that "[w]ho, in any manner, marks upon or affixes
to any unpatented article the word 'patent,' . . . for the purpose of deceiving
the public, shall be liable, for every such offense, to a penalty of not less
than one hundred dollars."31 Again, this statute included a qui tam provi-
sion under which "one half of said penalty [goes] to the person who shall
sue for the same, and the other to the use of the United States." 32
B. The Modern False-Marking Statute
The language of both predecessor false-marking statutes largely paral-
lels that of the modem false-marking statute, 35 U.S.C. § 292, which pro-
vides:
Whoever marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in advertising in connection
with any unpatented article, the word "patent" or any word or number
importing that the same is patented for the purpose of deceiving the pub-
lic; or
Whoever marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in advertising in connection
with any article, the words "patent applied for," "patent pending," or any
word importing that an application for patent has been made, when no
application for patent has been made, or if made, is not pending, for the
purpose of deceiving the public-
Shall be fined not more than $500 for every such offense.
(b) Any person may sue for the penalty, in which event one-half shall go
to the person suing and the other to the use of the United States.33
From this text, courts have identified two elements of a false-marking
claim: "(1) marking an unpatented article and (2) intent to deceive the pub-
lic." 34 Notably, the most significant difference between the historical false-
marking statutes and the current one is the penalty; under the earlier sta-
30. See London v. Everett H. Dunbar Corp., 179 F. 506, 508 (1st Cir. 1910).
31. Id. at 507.
32. Id.
33. 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2006) (first enacted in 1952). The first paragraph of the statute-which is not
relevant to this analysis-reads:
Whoever, without the consent of the patentee, marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in advertising
in connection with anything made, used, offered for sale, or sold by such person within the
United States, or imported by the person into the United States, the name or any imitation of
the name of the patentee, the patent number, or the words "patent," "patentee," or the like,
with the intent of counterfeiting or imitating the mark of the patentee, or of deceiving the pub-
lic and inducing them to believe that the thing was made, offered for sale, sold, or imported
into the United States by or with the consent of the patentee.
Id. § 292(a).
34. Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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tutes, the prescribed penalty was a minimum of $100, whereas now, the
penalty is set at a maximum of $500.35 Like the earlier false-marking sta-
tutes, § 292 contains a qui tam provision in paragraph (b), which allows
private individuals to bring false-marking suits on behalf of the U.S. gov-
ernment in return for a monetary award upon winning. 36
C. Qui Tam Statutes
The term "qui tam" originates from the Latin phrase "qui tam pro do-
mino rege, quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur," which means "who as
well for the king as for himself sues in this matter." 37 Qui tam statutes orig-
inally surfaced in Roman criminal law and allowed private citizens to pros-
ecute defendants in exchange for a portion of the defendant's property if
the former prevailed. 38 The English common law featured many qui tam
provisions, some of which traveled across the Atlantic to be incorporated
into the American legal system.39 Such provisions enable the government
to "enlist the aid of private individuals" in its prosecution efforts40 by in-
centivizing the latter with monetary awards, which thereby "alleviat[es] the
government's need to pursue" these actions alone4' and allows the gov-
ernment to conserve its resources.
Presently, three other qui tam statutes in addition to § 292 remain in
force in American law, all of which Congress enacted over 100 years ago.42
Many challengers have questioned the constitutionality of such statutes on
various grounds that are beyond the scope of this note.43 The qui tam pro-
35. See 35 U.S.C. § 292; see also S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 31 (1952), reprinted in 1952
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2424 ("The minimum fine [under 35 U.S.C. § 50] .. . is replaced [in 35 U.S.C.
§ 292] by a higher maximum.").
36. See 35 U.S.C. § 292(b).
37. Eric S. Askanase, Note, Qui Tam and the False Claims Act: Criminal Punishment in Civil
Disguise, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 472,472 (2003).
38. See Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 381, 385
(2001).
39. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774-77 (2000) (provid-
ing detailed history of qui tam statutes).
40. John C. Kunich, Qui Tam: White Knight or Trojan Horse, 33 A.F. L. REV. 31,32 (1990).
41. Haynes v. R.H. Dyck, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-02944-MCE-EFB, 2007 WL 3010574, at *3 (E.D.
Cal. Oct. 15, 2007).
42. See Vt. Agency, 529 U.S. at 768-69 n.1 (listing 25 U.S.C. § 81 (contracting with Indians), 25
U.S.C. § 201 (Indian protection provision), and 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. (False Claims Act)). See also
infra Part III.A for further discussion of the False Claims Act.
43. See Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 619 F.3d 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that qui tam
plaintiff had Article III standing under 35 U.S.C. § 292); Vt. Agency, 529 U.S. at 787 (holding that qui
tam plaintiff had Article III standing under False Claims Act); DOYLE, supra note 2, at 23-32 (discuss-
ing constitutional concerns surrounding qui tam statutes generally); Bales, supra note 38, at 395-435
(discussing constitutional challenges to qui tam statutes). In February 2011, a federal district court held
that the qui tam provision of § 292 violates the Take Care Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See Unique
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vision of § 292 involves the public in the government's fight against false
marking, a practice which negatively impacts society for the reasons dis-
cussed below.
D. Policy Rationales Underlying Patent Marking Statutes
Patentees have a significant incentive to mark their products with va-
lid patent numbers. Specifically, under 35 U.S.C. § 287, patentees can re-
cover damages for infringement only if they provided notice of their patents
to the public by marking their patented products or if they directly notified
accused infringers of their patents.44 In any event, patentees can recover
only those infringement damages that occurred after they provided notice
of their patents to the infringing party.45
Marking is important for furthering the aims of patent law. As the Su-
preme Court stated, "The federal patent system .. . embodies a carefully
crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful,
and nonobvious advances in technology and design in return for the exclu-
sive right to practice the invention for a period of years." 46 By marking
their products, patentees "provide[] a basis for the public to ascertain the
status of the intellectual property embodied in [an] article in general circu-
lation." 47 Because there is an "important public interest in permitting full
and free competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the
public domain,"48 patent marking serves to clearly delineate those inven-
tions that are off-limits to the public and thereby prevents "innocent in-
fringement."49
Product Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade Valve, Inc., No. 5:10-CV-1912, 2011 WL 649998, at *&*7 (N.D.
Ohio Feb. 23, 2011), af'dNo. 5:10-CV-1912, 2011 WL 924341 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 14, 2011) (finding
that "the government lacks sufficient control to enable the President to 'take care that the Laws be
faithfully executed"' with respect to § 292 because the "statute essentially represents a wholesale
delegation of criminal law enforcement power to private entities with no control exercised by the
Department of Justice"). The issue is currently pending before the Federal Circuit. See US. ex rel.
FLFMC, LLC v. Wham-O, Inc. (Case No. 2011-1067).
44. See 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2006). Note that § 287 does not apply to method or process claims
because "ordinarily . .. there is nothing to mark" with respect to the patented inventions covered by
such claims. Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng'g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1538-39 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("Where
the patent contains both apparatus and method claims, however, to the extent that there is a tangible
item to mark by which notice of the asserted method claims can be given, a party is obliged to do so if it
intends to avail itself of the constructive notice provisions of section 287(a).").
45. See 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2006).
46. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989).
47. Id. at 161.
48. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
49. Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enterprise Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 394 (1936).
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Accordingly, falsely marking unpatented articles disrupts the inform-
ing function that marking is intended to serve. Section 292 thus "penal-
ize[s] those who would palm off upon the public unpatented articles, by
falsely and fraudulently representing them to have been patented."50 False
marking has many negative consequences. Firstly, "[a]cts of false marking
deter innovation and stifle competition in the marketplace" by making po-
tential competitors believe that someone has already patented their innova-
tion, thereby causing them to abandon their work to avoid infringing
another's patent.5' Moreover, false marking "increases the cost to the pub-
lic of ascertaining" whether a patentee actually holds a monopoly on the
intellectual property embodied in the marked product.52 Finally, the public
might assume upon seeing the word "patented" on an article that "[the
item] has some peculiar value or merit sufficient to induce the govern-
ment ... to give the inventor the exclusive right to make and vend [it]."53
Thus, false marking may give the artificial impression that an article is
somehow "more useful or desirable" than other articles that are not similar-
ly marked.54
Clearly, the false-marking statute serves an important function in so-
ciety. There is no question that egregious acts of false marking should be
prosecuted. However, this prosecution must be carried out under an appro-
priate burden of proof.
E. Burdens ofProof Generally
Burdens of proof serve important functions in our legal system. First,
they "represent[] an attempt to instruct the fact-finder concerning the de-
gree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of
factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." 55 Second, they
"serve[] to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the
relative importance attached to the ultimate decision." 56 Third, they reflect
"the wide difference in the purpose, the character, and [the] situation of the
50. Calderwood v. Mansfield, 71 F. Supp. 480,482 (N.D. Cal. 1947) (discussing an earlier version
of the false-marking statute).
51. Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1302-03 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
52. Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
53. Oliphant v. Salem Flouring Mills Co., 18 F. Cas. 647, 647-48 (D. Or. 1878) (No. 10,486).
54. Id. at 648.
55. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
56. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
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parties, and ... the natural effects of findings and judgments against the
defendants in controversies, civil and criminal." 57
Over time, American law developed a continuum of three standards of
proof for different types of cases. 58 Ranging from least to most stringent,
these standards are: preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing
evidence, and beyond a reasonable doubt.59
1. Preponderance of the Evidence
The preponderance standard typically applies to civil disputes between
private parties. 60 The standard is appropriate when one party seeks mone-
tary compensation from the other, as opposed to punishment. 61 Moreover,
the standard is best-suited to cases where litigants are "nearly equal in re-
sources, advantages, and situation." 62 Because the preponderance standard
allocates the risk of error equally among litigants, it is appropriate only
when "society has a minimal concern with the outcome" of the suit.63
2. Clear and Convincing Evidence
The clear and convincing standard-located between the purely civil
and criminal burdens of proof on the continuum-often applies when de-
fendants in civil cases face allegations of "fraud or some other quasi-
criminal wrongdoing." 64 In essence, "[t]he interests at stake in those cases
are deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of money," particularly
because the defendant stands to have his "reputation tarnished erroneous-
ly."65 The preponderance standard would be inappropriate in such cases
because "[an] individual should not be asked to share equally with society
the risk of error when the possible injury to the individual is significantly
greater than any possible harm to the state." 66
57. United States v. Shapleigh, 54 F. 126, 129 (8th Cir. 1893); see also Winship, 397 U.S. at 370-
72 (Harlan, J., concurring) (discussing view that different burdens of proof reflect varying conse-
quences of fact-finder making an erroneous factual conclusion in particular type of case).
58. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 423.
59. See id. at 423-24.
60. Id. at 423.
61. See Shapleigh, 54 F. at 129.
62. Id.
63. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423.
64. Id at 424.
65. Id
66. Id at 427.
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3. Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
Beyond a reasonable doubt-the strictest standard-applies in crimi-
nal cases where "[t]he accused ... has at stake interest of immense impor-
tance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon
conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the
conviction." 67 In such cases, "the risk of error to the individual must be
minimized," even at the expense of allowing some guilty individuals to go
free. 68 Because typical criminal cases involve governmental prosecution of
an individual, the parties generally possess significantly unequal resources,
and it would be unfair to allocate the risk of error equally amongst them.69
Moreover, the reasonable doubt standard "command[s] the respect and
confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law" because
it-as compared to the less strict standards-better assures society that
innocent people are not being convicted of serious crimes.70 In short, the
reasonable doubt standard is required in a criminal case where:
[The] purpose is punishment, not compensation, for injury; its prosecutor
is the state; the result to the defendant of its successful prosecution is ir-
reparable loss of character, and the loss of either life, liberty, or property;
and ... the presumption is that every man is innocent until the contrary
appears. 71
This note argues that the clear and convincing standard-as opposed
to the preponderance standard, which is presently endorsed by the Federal
Circuit-best complies with due process requirements by safeguarding the
significant interests of false-marking defendants while also promoting the
government's purpose in deterring and punishing the practice of false
marking.
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE FALSE-MARKING STATUTE
A. Historical Disagreements
Throughout American history, courts have largely disagreed about
which standard of proof should apply to the false-marking statutes. Some
67. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
68. Addington, 441 U.S. at 428.
69. United States v. Shapleigh, 54 F. 126, 129 (8th Cir. 1893) (noting "the inequality of the parties
in power, situation, and advantage in criminal cases where the government, with its unlimited resources,
trained detectives, willing officers, and counsel learned in the law" prosecutes "a single defendant,
unfamiliar with the practice of the court, unacquainted with their officers or attorneys, often without
means, and frequently too terrified to make a defense if he had one, while his character and his life,
liberty, or property rested upon the result of the trial").
70. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
71. Shapleigh, 54 F. at 129.
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courts interpreted these provisions to be criminal in nature and therefore
required plaintiffs to prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt. For ex-
ample, the Nichols v. Newell court ruled that under the 1842 false-marking
statute, "[t]he burden of proof [was] upon the plaintiff, to satisfy [the jury],
beyond a reasonable doubt, of such facts as are necessary to constitute the
offense." 72 Moreover, the court explained the notion of "intent to deceive"
using criminal law concepts, such as offering the example of a man firing a
loaded gun at another man to show "[t]he general rule . .. that a man is to
be held to intend that which is the necessary consequence of his acts." 73 In
its charge to the jury, the Nichols court also employed criminal law termi-
nology, such as "guilty," "not guilty," "acquit," and "innocent." 74 Like-
wise, in Tompkins v. Butterfield-a later case interpreting the 1870 false-
marking statute-the court ruled that "the offense must be proved by evi-
dence that leaves upon the minds of the jury no reasonable doubt that the
penalty has been incurred." 75 After recognizing that the statute "imposes a
penalty ... and it therefore becomes in its nature a criminal proceeding,"
the court reasoned that "[i]n an ordinary criminal prosecution it is not suffi-
cient to go only so far as to establish a preponderance of the evidence in
favor of the government." 76
Although not case law, an 1896 law review article provides one nine-
teenth-century scholar's perspective on the false-marking statute. The au-
thor asserted that "in order to prevail [the false-marking plaintiff] must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the marks were affixed to unpatented
articles by the defendant, that they were so affixed with intent to deceive
the public, and that the articles were unpatented." 77 Furthermore, the author
argued that this elevated burden of proof played a role in deterring plain-
tiffs who sought only financial gain from filing false-marking suits:
It is clear, after a consideration of the cases under this statute, that the
strictness of construction adopted by the courts, the heavy burden of
proof which is imposed upon the informer, and the obvious difficulty of
proving a fraudulent intent on the part of a defendant, combine to dis-
suade a person from undertaking the expense and trouble of litigation
merely for the sake of plunder. Only a genuinely interested or inspired
individual is likely to turn informer; and others are easily dissuaded from
72. Nichols v. Newell, 18 F. Cas. 199, 200 (D. Mass. 1853) (No. 10,245).
73. Id at 201.
74. See id at 200, 203.
75. Tompkins v. Butterfield, 25 F. 556, 558 (D. Mass. 1885).
76. Id at 557-58.
77. Odin B. Roberts, Actions Qui Tam Under the Patent Statutes of the United States, 10 HARV. L.
REv. 265, 269 (1896) (citing Nichols for support).
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lodging complaint so soon as the true nature of their prospects is made
clear to them.78
This point is certainly something to keep in mind when considering
the vast number of false-marking suits filed today by plaintiffs who have
suffered no competitive injury and instead seek massive awards for their
minimal efforts of looking up patent numbers on the USPTO website. 79
Despite this line of cases holding that false-marking claims required
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, other courts interpreting historical false-
marking provisions applied the mere preponderance standard. For instance,
the Hawloetz v. Kass court held that the trial judge below properly refused
to instruct the jury that the plaintiff had to prove his false-marking claim
"with the same particularity and exactness as on the trial of an indictment"
(i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt).80 Interestingly, the Hawloetz court cited
but did not distinguish Nichols v. Newell, although Nichols advocated the
reasonable doubt standard.81 In addressing why the reasonable doubt stan-
dard was inappropriate in the false-marking context, the Hawloetz court
reasoned that "it is not apparent why the rules of criminal evidence should
be imported into the trial of actions of debt for penalties, any more than in
any other civil actions in which an issue of criminal conduct, such as arson,
forgery, perjury, adultery, etc., may be involved." 82 This excerpt demon-
strates that the Hawloetz court actually recognized the inherent criminal
aspects of false-marking claims, despite requiring the least stringent burden
of proof.83 Notably, this is the first of two historical false-marking cases
cited by the Federal Circuit in Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co. 84
The second case cited in Pequignot is Hotchkiss v. Samuel Cupples
Wooden- Ware Co. 85 The Hotchkiss court instructed that under section
4901, "[t]o warrant a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on any particular count
in the complaint it must be made to appear by a clear preponderance of
evidence" that the defendant falsely marked a product for the purpose of
78. Id. at 274.
79. See supra Introduction, discussing trends in current false-marking litigation.
80. Hawloetz v. Kass, 25 F. 765, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1885) (interpreting section 4901, discussed supra
Part I.A.2).
81. See id. at 766.
82. Id. at 767.
83. In particular, the court's inclusion of false-marking claims among other "civil actions in which
an issue of criminal conduct . .. may be involved" seems to characterize false marking as a quasi-
criminal act. Id. at 767.
84. See Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
85. See id at 1364.
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deceiving the public. 86 However, the court provided no further explanation
for its application of the preponderance standard.87
Despite the apparent conflict among courts regarding whether a civil
or criminal burden of proof should apply to false-marking claims, many
courts agreed that the false-marking statutes were penal in nature. For in-
stance, the Pentlarge v. Kirby court referred to section 4901 as a "highly
penal" statute that had to be "construed strictly."88 Likewise, the London v.
Everett H. Dunbar Corp. court described section 4901 as "not compensato-
ry, but penal," and referred to the statute's penalty as a "pecuniary punish-
ment." 89 The Newgold v. American Electrical Novelty and Manufacturing
Co. court distinguished the "penalty" imposed under section 4901 from
remedial or compensatory damages that arise in other civil causes of action
by pointing out that "[s]ection 4901 ... not only describes the recovery as a
penalty,... but seems to contemplate only the deceit of the public and the
public wrong." 90 As a final example, the Brose v. Roebuck and Co. court
asserted that the plaintiffs "failure to prove any one of the [elements of a
false-marking claim under § 292] would have proved fatal to his cause
since the Act is penal in nature and must be strictly construed."91
Other courts acknowledged the penal nature of the false-marking sta-
tutes while simultaneously denying that the statutes were criminal. 92 For
instance, the Sippit Cups, Inc. v. Michael's Creations, Inc. court noted a
"clear distinction between the word 'penal' . . . and the word 'criminal'
before concluding that "an action under Section 292 of the Patent Act,
which may lead to the imposition of a penalty, is not a criminal cause." 93
Similarly, the Filmon Process Corp. v. Spell-Right Corp. court rejected the
defendant's argument that double jeopardy applied to false-marking judg-
ments because "§ 292(b), while penal, is not a criminal statute." 94 The
court reasoned that "[§ 292] is designed to protect the exclusiveness of the
86. Hotchkiss v. Samuel Cupples Wooden-Ware Co., 53 F. 1018, 1021 (E.D. Mo. 1891).
87. See id; see also Grafflus v. Weather-Seal, 165 F.2d 782, 782 (6th Cir. 1948) (ruling-without
citing any legal authority-that plaintiffs must prove the elements of a false-marking claim under
section 4901 "by the weight of the evidence").
88. Pentlarge v. Kirby, 19 F. 501, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1884).
89. London v. Everett H. Dunbar Corp., 179 F. 506, 508 (1st Cir. 1910).
90. Newgold v. Am. Elec. Novelty & Mfg. Co., 108 F. 341, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1901).
91. Brose v. Roebuck & Co., 455 F.2d 763, 765 (5th Cir. 1972) (emphasis in original).
92. But see Haynes v. R.H. Dyck, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-02944-MCE-EFB, 2007 WL 3010574, at *2-
*3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2007) (holding that "claims brought under section 292 are not extinguished upon
the death of the party," thereby implying that § 292 claims are not penal in nature, given the "well-
settled rule that actions upon penal statutes do not survive the death of a party") (quotation and citation
omitted).
93. Sippit Cupps, Inc. v. Michael's Creations, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 58, 61 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
94. Filmon Process Corp. v. Spell-Right Corp., 404 F.2d 1351, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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use of the invention granted to the patentee" and thus "as a practical matter,
the patentee is the only likely enforcer of it, as recovery requires proof that
the statements were made without his consent."95 Accordingly, the court
concluded that "the statute's remedial purposes outweigh the conceptual
difficulties posed by the ostensibly non-compensatory character of the pe-
nalty relief awarded." 96 One commentator criticized the Filmon court for
"focus[ing] only on the perceived remedial nature of the statute to the pa-
tentee when someone unlawfully marks its products with the patentee's
patent[] [numbers]," 97 an act which implicates the first paragraph of § 292
but does not address the rest of the statute.98 The commentator asserted that
the Filmon court's characterization of § 292 as remedial "falls flat" for the
"scenario where the patentee is accused of having falsely marked its prod-
ucts with its own patent numbers," the practice treated in this note.99
Although this historical survey fails to resolve which burden of proof
should apply to § 292, it does indicate that many courts traditionally per-
ceived the false-marking statutes to be distinct from typical civil statutes
lacking the same penal character. This observation impacts the due process
analysis below because the Supreme Court ruled that when a statutory
sanction "has historically been regarded as a punishment," this weighs in
favor of finding that the statute is "punitive," thereby implicating Due
Process Clause protections.' 00 Against this background, however, the Fed-
eral Circuit adopted the preponderance standard-which usually applies in
ordinary civil suits-for proving claims under § 292.
B. The Federal Circuit's Interpretation
The Federal Circuit, established in 1982,101 first treated § 292 in 1986
when it decided Arcadia Machine & Tool Inc. v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc.
In that case, however, the court stated only that the plaintiff "totally
failed ... to produce any evidence of intent to deceive the public," without
discussing the relevant burden of proof.102 It was not until 2005 when the
Federal Circuit decided Clontech Laboratories, Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Robert A. Matthews, Diferent suits by diferent plaintiffs on same alleged acts offalse mark-
ing, 5 ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 34:103.50 (2011) (emphasis in original) (Westlaw).
98. See supra note 33 for text of § 292(a).
99. Matthews, supra note 97 (emphasis added).
100. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) (emphasis added).
101. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 3.




that the court first ruled-without citing any legal authority-that "in order
to establish knowledge of falsity the plaintiff must show by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the party accused of false marking did not have a
reasonable belief that the articles were properly marked." 03 Furthermore,
the court explained that § 292 was not a strict-liability statute, such that an
act of false marking would automatically amount to deceptive intent.104
Rather, under § 292, "Intent to deceive is a state of mind arising when a
party acts with sufficient knowledge that what it is saying is not so and
consequently that the recipient of its saying will be misled into thinking
that the statement is true."105 Four years later in Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon
Tool Co., the Federal Circuit again endorsed the preponderance standard,
citing Clontech as its only supporting authority.106
The Federal Circuit's unexplained application of the preponderance
standard to the false-marking statute is confusing for three reasons. First,
the available legislative history for § 292 is scant, but clearly acknowledges
the criminal nature of the statute. In particular, the Senate Report for the
1952 Patent Act-under which Congress enacted § 292-states, "Section
292 is a criminal statute .... This is a criminal provision.... The informer
action is included as additional to an ordinary criminal action."10 7 The pre-
ponderance standard, which is typically reserved for civil causes of ac-
tion,108 seems inappropriate when applied to a provision that the Senate
expressly deemed criminal.
Second, the Federal Circuit relied on criminal law concepts to further
interpret "intent to deceive" after Clontech. In Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co.,
the court held that "the combination of a false [marking] and knowledge
that the [marking] was false creates a rebuttable presumption [that the de-
fendant acted with] intent to deceive the public." 09 The court then ana-
103. Clontech Labs., Inc., v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (emphasis
added).
104. See id. at 1352.
105. Id.
106. See Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
107. S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 9, 22 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2403, 2424.
108. See discussion supra Part I.E 1.
109. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The Federal Circuit
further held that defendants can rebut this presumption by showing-also by a preponderance-that
they did not act with a deceptive purpose. See id at 1364. In Pequignot, the court found that the defen-
dant, Solo Cup, sufficiently rebutted the presumption of intent that arose when Solo Cup knowingly
marked its products with expired patent numbers. See id. Solo Cup achieved this by presenting evidence
that "a wholesale replacement of [its] mold cavities [featuring the expired numbers] would be costly
and burdensome." Id. at 1359. Furthermore, Solo Cup showed that it received advice from its legal
counsel asserting that the company's proposed policy of eliminating expired patent numbers from
replacement mold cavities over time was permissible under § 292. See id. Accordingly, the court found
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lyzed the notion of intent under the criminal law principles of "purpose"
and "knowledge," and even cited a Supreme Court decision about inten-
tional homicide for the proposition that a "conclusive presumption regard-
ing intent in the criminal context [is] unconstitutional."]l 0 It seems strange
that the Federal Circuit advocated a civil burden of proof for § 292, given
that the court had to rely on criminal law concepts to explain operation of
the statute.
Third, even after conceding that "[t]he bar for proving deceptive intent
[under § 292] is particularly high, given that the false marking statute is a
criminal one" and noting that "in civil cases, intent to deceive often re-
quires clear and convincing evidence," the Federal Circuit in Pequignot
confusingly reiterated its Clontech holding that the lowest possible eviden-
tiary standard applied to § 292.111 Therefore, the Federal Circuit has thus
far offered a less-than-satisfactory analysis for its ruling that plaintiffs must
prove false-marking claims under § 292 by a mere preponderance of the
evidence.11 2 As demonstrated below, policy and due process considerations
necessitate a higher burden of proof for § 292 than the Federal Circuit
chose to adopt.
III. BURDENS OF PROOF IN ANALOGOUS LEGAL CONTEXTS
An investigation of the burdens of proof applied in analogous legal
contexts supports elevating the burden of proof as to § 292. First, the histo-
ry of the False Claims Act-one of four remaining qui tam statutes in the
United Statesl 3-reveals that a lower burden of proof correlates to in-
creased filings of qui tam lawsuits, which has implications for the current
trend among false-marking filings. Second, the rationales for requiring
clear and convincing evidence to prove intent to deceive in connection with
common-law fraud and inequitable conduct also apply to § 292.
that Solo's "true intent" was to "reduce costs and business disruption," rather than deceive the public
with its false markings. Id at 1364.
110. Id at 1363 (citing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979)).
111. Id. at 1363. The Federal Circuit provided only one clue to explain its application of the pre-
ponderance standard to § 292: reference to two nineteenth-century cases that also applied this low
evidentiary burden to previous incarnations of the false-marking statute-namely, Hawloetz v. Kass and
Hotchkiss v. Samuel Cupples Wooden-Ware Co., both discussed supra in Part II.A. See id at 1363-64.
112. See Unique Product Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade Valve, Inc., No. 5:10-CV-1912, 2011 WL
924341, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 14, 2011) (describing the "confusing nature of [§ 292]" in light of the
Federal Circuit's analysis of the statute).
113. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768-69 n.1 (2000)
(listing 25 U.S.C. § 81 (contracting with Indians), 25 U.S.C. § 201 (Indian protection provision), and 31
U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. (False Claims Act)).
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A. The False Claims Act
The False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., is analogous to
the false-marking statute because it also contains a qui tam provision."14
The FCA imposes a "civil penalty" of up to $10,000 and treble damages
upon "any person who," inter alia, "knowingly presents, or causes to be
presented, . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval" to the
U.S. government. 115 Either the government, itself, may bring a civil FCA
claim under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a),1 6 or a private citizen (known as a "rela-
tor") may bring a qui tam civil action under § 3730(b)(1)." 7
1. Historical Purpose of the FCA
Congress enacted the first false-claims statute in 1863 "to combat
rampant fraud and price gouging in procurement contracts during the
[American] Civil War." 1 8 Through the qui tam provision, Congress incen-
tivized private citizens to bring false-claims suits and thereby created "a
veritable citizens' army [that] would join in the struggle to root out fraud
against the United States and replenish the sovereign's coffers."ll 9 Recog-
nizing that frivolous qui tam lawsuits might result from the prospect of
monetary awards, the 1863 Act required relators to bear the costs of false-
claims lawsuits.120 One contemporary senator cleverly described the qui
tam provision as sending "'a rogue to catch a rogue." 1 21
2. 1986 Amendments to the FCA
In 1943, Congress amended the FCA primarily to bar "parasitic [qui
tam] suits" in which the government already knew of a particular fraudu-
lent claim.122 This amendment caused a significant reduction in the number
114. See 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) (2006) (qui tam provision of the patent false-marking statute).
115. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2006).
116. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (2006) ("If the Attorney General finds that a person has violated or is
violating section 3729, the Attorney General may bring a civil action under this section against the
person.").
117. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2006) ("A [private] person may bring a civil action for a violation
of section 3729 for the person and for the United States Government. The action shall be brought in the
name of the Government. The action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General give
written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.").
118. Troy D. Chandler, Note, Lawyer Turned Plaintiff Law Firms and Lawyers as Relators Under
the False Claims Act, 35 Hous. L. REv. 541, 543 (1998).
119. Kunich, supra note 40.
120. See Chandler, supra note 118, at 544.
121. Id.
122. Kunich, supra note 40.
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of qui tam suits filed under the Act in the subsequent decades. 123 As a re-
sult, Congress enacted further amendments in 1986 to "significantly shar-
pen[] the teeth of the FCA and [make] it easier for FCA suits to be
prosecuted successfully." 24 The 1986 amendments changed the FCA con-
siderably by raising the civil penalties, increasing the rewards for qui tam
relators, altering the relationship of the government and relators by shifting
the parties' responsibilities, liberalizing the knowledge required for liabili-
ty, and-most notably here-lowering the burden of proof for the elements
of an FCA violation to preponderance of the evidence.125 After the 1986
amendments, the number of qui tam suits brought under the FCA skyrock-
eted, largely due to the increased damages awards and the reduced burden
of proof. 126
3. The FCA and the Preponderance Standard
Although at least one court in the late nineteenth century applied the
reasonable doubt standard to a claim brought under the then-existing false-
claims statute, 127 in the years leading up to the 1986 amendments, courts
more commonly disagreed about whether to apply the preponderance stan-
dard or the clear and convincing standard to the FCA.128 Courts that
adopted the more stringent standard justified this practice on two grounds:
first, "the 'gravamen' of the statute was fraud," and thus "FCA plaintiff~s]
[were] held to the burden of proof in common law fraud suits"; and second,
the FCA was penal and therefore required an elevated burden of proof.129
123. See id. at 33.
124. Id
125. See Askanase, supra note 37, at 473-74; see also 31 U.S.C. § 373 1(c) (2006) ("In any action
brought under section 3730, the United States shall be required to prove all essential elements of the
cause of action, including damages, by a preponderance of the evidence.").
126. See Frank Lasalle, Comment, The Civil False Claims Act: The Need for a Heightened Burden
of Proof as a Prerequisite for Forfeiture, 28 AKRON L. REV. 497, 501-02 (1995) ("Since the 1986
amendments were enacted, the number of qui tam suits has risen dramatically, from 12 suits in fiscal
year 1987 to 220 suits in fiscal year 1994. As a result of this rise in the number of suits brought the
Government had recovered roughly $800 million through qui tam and whistle-blower litigation by the
end of fiscal year 1994. The Department of Justice reported that it recovered a total of $1.09 billion
from civil fraud litigation in fiscal year 1994 alone.").
127. See United States v. Shapleigh, 54 F. 126, 134 (8th Cir. 1893) ("While civil in form, all [of the
suit's] other characteristics were those of a criminal case; its prosecutor was the government; its pur-
pose was punishment; the defendant's conviction of a felony was essential to the plaintiffs recovery;
the defendant's character and property were in jeopardy, because the government sought to punish him
in this suit; and the verdict and judgment here would be a bar to any criminal prosecution for the same
offense. The case became a criminal case under the cloak of a civil suit, and the reason of the rule
required, and the decisions of the supreme court warranted, the application to it of the rule that the
plaintiff must establish its case by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.").
128. See LaSalle, supra note 126, at 509-11.
129. Id. at 510.
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Ultimately, however, Congress did not follow this line of reasoning and
instead selected the preponderance standard for the FCA.130 A Senate Re-
port addressing the 1986 amendments sheds light on Congress' reasoning:
Inasmuch as False Claims Act proceedings are civil and remedial in na-
ture and are brought to recover compensatory damages, the Committee
believes that the appropriate burden of proof devolving upon the United
States in a civil False Claims Act suit is by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. . . . [N]otwithstanding the fact that the act permits a treble recov-
ery, it would be governed by the traditional civil burden of proof.131
In short, Congress adopted the preponderance standard because it be-
lieved the FCA was not penal in nature and that suits brought under the Act
were comparable to ordinary civil suits. 132
4. Lessons to be Learned from the FCA
The history of the 1986 amendments to the False Claims Act clearly
demonstrates that the combination of a provision offering qui tam plaintiffs
large monetary rewards and a low burden of proof results in an increased
number of qui tam filings. The same situation presently exists in the patent
false-marking context as a result of the Federal Circuit's decisions mandat-
ing that the $500 penalty under § 292 applies on a per-article basiSl 33 and
setting a low burden of proof for false-marking claims.134 However, whe-
reas Congress intended to create this flood of qui tam suits under the FCA
by enacting its 1986 amendments, Congress arguably did not intend for
§ 292 to be used in this way. Two observations support this argument.
First, Congress selected the preponderance standard for proving claims
under the FCA,135 whereas the Federal Circuit adopted the same standard
for § 292 claims without any apparent congressional endorsement.136
Second, "[u]nlike false claims against the government, misuse of a patent
marking does not involve a proprietary injury to the United States," but
130. See 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c).
131. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 31 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5296.
132. One commentator has argued that the preponderance standard as applied to the FCA violates
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See LaSalle, supra note 126, at 518-532 (arguing that
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment demands a higher burden of proof-namely the clear
and convincing standard-to be applied to the FCA as a penal statute).
133. See Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
134. See Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see
also Michael R. O'Neill, False Patent Marking Claims: The New Threat to Business, 22 INTELL. PROP.
& TECH. LAW J. 22, (2010) (noting rareness of false marking claims under § 292 historically and ar-
guing that prior to Forest Group, "even those parties that suffered some actual injury as a result of a
competitor's false patent marking had little incentive to file suit and incur the fees and costs associated
with litigation").
135. See 31 U.S.C. § 3731(d); see also discussion supra Part III.A.2.
136. See Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1352-53.
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rather only an injury to its sovereignty.137 Accordingly, the government
does not have the same financial interest under § 292 as it does under the
FCA to encourage qui tam plaintiffs-who have likely suffered no compet-
itive injury, themselves-to file suits seeking enormous awards. 138 There-
fore, common sense dictates that either reducing the penalty or raising the
burden of proof with respect to § 292 would quell the number of frivolous
false-marking suits presently being filed by bounty-seeking qui tam plain-
tiffs.
B. Other Claims Requiring Proof ofIntent to Deceive
To prove false-marking claims under § 292, plaintiffs must show that
the defendant acted with intent to deceive the public.139 Analogously,
plaintiffs claiming either common-law fraud or inequitable conduct must
also prove that the defendant acted with intent to deceive. The fact that
both of these latter claims require proof by clear and convincing evidence
sheds further doubt on the appropriateness of the preponderance standard
as applied to § 292.
1. Common-Law Fraud
To establish a prima facie fraud claim under the common law, plain-
tiffs must generally show by clear and convincing evidence the following
elements: "(1) false representation or concealment of a material fact; (2)
reasonably calculated to deceive; (3) made with the intent to deceive; (4)
resulting in injury or detrimental reliance."1 40 The clear and convincing
standard is more appropriate than the preponderance standard in this con-
137. Pequignotv. Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 714, 728 (E.D. Va. 2009).
138. A bill was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives in September 2010 that proposed
amending § 292 such that the provision's $500 penalty would apply only "in the aggregate, for all
offenses in connection with such articles," thereby overturning Forest Group Inc. v. Bon Tool Co. and
reducing qui tam plaintiffs' potential awards under the statute. H.R. 6352, 111th Cong. (2010); see also
H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 16(b) (2011) (proposing to limit damages recoverable under § 292(b) to those
"adequate to compensate for the injury"). Also, in March 2011, the U.S. Senate passed a patent-reform
bill that would amend § 292(b) such that only a "person who has suffered a competitive injury as a
result of a violation of this section" could file a civil false-marking suit. S. 23, 112th Cong. § 2(k)
(2011). The existence of these bills evidences displeasure in Congress surrounding the current false-
marking climate.
139. See Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
140. 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 475 (2010) (emphasis added); see also Lalone v. United
States, 164 U.S. 255, 257 (1896) ("In all proceedings instituted to recover moneys, or to set aside and
annul deeds or contracts or other written instruments, on the ground of alleged fraud practiced by a
defendant upon a plaintiff, the rule is of long standing, and is of universal application, that the evidence
tending to prove the fraud, and upon which to found a verdict or decree, must be clear and satisfacto-
ry.... A mere preponderance of evidence, which at the same time is vague or ambiguous, is not suffi-
cient to warrant a finding of fraud, and will not sustain a judgment based on such finding.").
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text because defendants accused of fraud stand to have their "reputation[s]
tarnished erroneously."l41 The law recognizes preservation of one's reputa-
tion as a significant interest and thus shifts the risk of error away from the
defendant.142 Notably, under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, plaintiffs alleging fraud face a heightened pleading requirement.143
2. Inequitable Conduct
Accused patent infringers can challenge the enforceability of a patent-
in-suit by arguing that the patentee committed inequitable conduct before
the USPTO. 144 To establish inequitable conduct, the patent challenger must
show by clear and convincing evidence that the patentee "(1) either made
an affirmative misrepresentation of material fact, failed to disclose material
information, or submitted false material information, and (2) intended to
deceive the [USPTO]."l 45 The Federal Circuit explained the need for an
elevated standard of proof in this context:
[The] penalty for inequitable conduct is so severe, [i.e.,] the loss of the
entire patent even where every claim clearly meets every requirement of
patentability.... Just as it is inequitable to permit a patentee who ob-
tained his patent through deliberate misrepresentations or omissions of
material information to enforce the patent against others, it is also ine-
quitable to strike down an entire patent where the patentee only commit-
ted minor missteps or acted with minimal culpability or in good faith.146
141. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,424 (1979).
142. But see Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1991) (suggesting that "[u]nlike a large
number, and perhaps the majority, of the States, Congress has chosen the preponderance standard when
it has created substantive causes of action for fraud," as shown by the False Claims Act and other
federal statutes listed therein). Note, however, that in the § 292 context, the Federal Circuit-not Con-
gress-adopted the preponderance standard. See Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d
1347, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
143. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a
person's mind may be alleged generally.").
144. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(en banc) ("When a court has finally determined that inequitable conduct occurred in relation to one or
more claims during prosecution of the patent application, the entire patent is rendered unenforceable.").
145. Scanner Techs. Corp. v. ICOS Vision Sys. Corp., 528 F.3d 1365, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (em-
phasis added) (quotation and citation omitted). Courts employ a two-step process to determine if a
patentee has committed inequitable conduct. See Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 1998). First, the trial court assesses the materiality of the information withheld by the paten-
tee. See id Next, the trial court determines "whether the evidence shows a threshold level of intent to
mislead the PTO." Id. This analysis involves a sliding-scale approach, such that "[t]he more material
the omission, the less evidence of intent will be required in order to find that inequitable conduct has
occurred," and vice versa. Id.
146. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Note that "[t]he court in exceptional [patent infringement] cases may award reasonable attorney fees to
the prevailing party." 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006). The Federal Circuit indicated that cases in which paten-
tees have committed inequitable conduct before the USPTO are "exceptional" under § 285. See Taltech
Ltd. v. Esquel Enters. Ltd., 604 F.3d 1324, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Therefore, patentees facing inequita-
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Essentially, the court believed that allocating the risk of error equally
among the litigants would be unjust in light of the weighty interests at stake
for the defendant. This is true despite the fact that the "public [has] a para-
mount interest in seeing that patent monopolies spring from backgrounds
free from fraud or other inequitable conduct." 47 Finally, as with common-
law fraud, inequitable conduct must be pled with particularity under Rule
9(b).148
3. Lessons to be Learned from Common-Law Fraud and Inequitable
Conduct
The rationales for requiring clear and convincing evidence to prove
inequitable conduct and common-law fraud apply with equal force to false-
marking claims. First, just as a defendant's reputation is on the line in a
fraud action, a defendant's business reputation is at stake in a false-marking
action. Specifically, consumers who learn of the false-marking activity may
believe that the defendant's products are somehow of a lesser quality as a
result of being falsely marked, and may therefore stop purchasing the prod-
ucts. 149 Second, while it is true that a person accused of false marking does
not stand to lose any patent rights, unlike a patentee accused of inequitable
conduct, both offenses may share similar consequences. Specifically, the
loss of patent rights following a finding of inequitable conduct causes a
financial impact-including lost licensing revenues, etc.-as well as a
competitive impact, given that the patentee's competitors can thereafter
engage in lawful copying of the formerly patented invention. Both of these
factors combined can put the former patentee out of business. Similarly, a
ble conduct allegations also stand to forfeit significant amounts of money in attorneys' fees. Walker
Process fraud, a cause of action related to inequitable conduct, originated in a Supreme Court case
which held that "the enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent Office may be violative of
§ 2 of the Sherman Act," such that "the treble damage provisions of § 4 of the Clayton Act would be
available to an injured party." Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S.
172, 174 (1965). Given the possibility of treble damages, in order "[t]o demonstrate Walker Process
fraud, a claimant must make higher threshold showings of both materiality and intent than are required
to show inequitable conduct." Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Accordingly, the sliding scale of materiality and intent applied to inequitable conduct claims does not
apply to Walker Process fraud claims, and Walker Process claimants must prove "that the patent would
not have issued but for the patent examiner's justifiable reliance on the patentee's misrepresentation or
omission." Id at 1347 (emphasis added).
147. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945).
148. See Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("[Wle
hold that in pleading inequitable conduct in patent cases, Rule 9(b) requires identification of the specific
who, what, when, where, and how of the material misrepresentation or omission committed before the
PTO.").
149. See Oliphant v. Salem Flouring Mills Co., 18 F. Cas. 647, 647-48 (D. Or. 1878) (No. 10,486)
(discussing perceived quality and value of products covered by government-issued patents).
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company that falsely marks its products in violation of § 292 may be forced
to pay a substantial amount of money, perhaps enough to put it out of busi-
ness. Therefore, the interests at stake for defendants accused of false mark-
ing may be quite similar to those of defendants facing fraud or inequitable-
conduct claims.
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit recently held that false-marking
plaintiffs are required to plead the elements of § 292 claims with particular-
ity under Rule 9(b), which likewise applies to both common-law fraud and
inequitable-conduct claims. 50 For these reasons alone, courts should apply
the clear and convincing standard to § 292 claims. However, there exist
further constitutional reasons why the burden of proof for § 292 should be
raised above a mere preponderance.
IV. INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PREPONDERANCE STANDARD AS APPLIED TO
PATENT FALSE MARKING UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
The final and most compelling reason why the burden of proof for
false marking must be raised is that the preponderance standard is constitu-
tionally insufficient here. Section § 292 is-at the very least-a quasi-
criminal provision. Consequently, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment demands a stricter burden of proof in connection with false-
marking claims.
A. Section 292 as a (Quasi-) Criminal Statute
The Supreme Court provided a two-factor test in United States v.
Ward for determining whether a given statutory penalty is civil or criminal,
a distinction of "constitutional import."' 5 ' The first factor asks "whether
Congress, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either ex-
pressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other."1 52 The second
factor, which applies only "where Congress has indicated an intention to
establish a civil penalty," asks "whether the statutory scheme was so puni-
tive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention."1 53 Accordingly,
150. See In re BP Lubricants USA Inc., Misc. No. 960, 2011 WL 873147, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15,
2011) ("In an analogous area of the law, namely, the False Claims Act, every regional circuit has held
that a relator must meet the requirements of Rule 9(b) when bringing complaints on behalf of the gov-
ernment.... We see no sound reason to treat § 292 actions any differently."). Notably, the plaintiff in
this case was none other than Thomas Simonian, the "most prolific false marking plaintiff." See False
Marking Plaintiff supra note 11.
151. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 248-49.
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the first Ward factor may be determinative where Congress indicated an
intention to establish a criminal penalty.
Here, the language of the false-marking statute does not explicitly
contain the word "criminal" or "civil."1 54 However, the legislative history
of § 292 evidences that Congress (or at least the Senate) expressly intended
for this to be a criminal provision.155 Therefore, the first Ward factor
weighs in favor of finding that the penalty under § 292 is criminal.
Even if the first Ward factor were not determinative-which it argua-
bly is here-applying the second Ward factor to § 292 further supports the
criminal nature of this provision. In Ward, the Court referenced a list of
factors from its earlier decision in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez that is
"helpful" in applying the second Ward factor.156 That list includes:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence,
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable
for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative pur-
pose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often point in dif-
fering directions. 157
In a later case, the Court explained that when Congress "confer[s] au-
thority upon administrative agencies"-as opposed to judicial bodies-to
impose statutory penalties, this serves as "prima facie evidence" that Con-
gress intended the penalties to be civil.1 58
Here, multiple Kennedy factors weigh in favor of finding that Con-
gress created a punitive scheme in § 292.159 First, in the past, many courts
that addressed this issue deemed § 292 and its predecessor statutes to be
either criminal or at least highly penal, which suggests that the false-
154. See 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2006). Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (establishing a "civil penalty"
under the False Claims Act).
155. See S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 9, 31 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2403, 2424.
156. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 (noting that list of factors is "certainly neither exhaustive nor
dispositive").
157. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
158. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 103 (1997).
159. See Matthews, supra note 97 (analyzing whether the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment applies to § 292 and concluding that "double jeopardy should preclude a defendant from
being subjected to two penalties from two different § 292(b) suits based on the same alleged acts of
patent false marking as both suits involve the 'same offense' punishable as a 'criminal' violation").
Matthews asserts that "[p]erhaps the strongest argument against finding that § 292 is a 'criminal' statute
for purpose of double jeopardy arises from the burden of proof applied to these claims," thereby sug-
gesting the incongruence of the preponderance standard as applied to § 292-a seemingly criminal
provision-by the Federal Circuit in Clontech. Id. This suggestion in Matthews' article provided the
inspiration for this note.
14132011]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
marking penalty has historically been regarded-at least in some courts-
as a punishment.160 Second, the § 292 penalty comes into play only after a
finding of scienter, given that intent to deceive the public is a key element
of the false-marking cause of action. 161 Third, § 292 exists to "punish[] the
defendant for conduct that deceives the public regarding the patented status
of the marked product and seeks to deter such behavior in the future."l 62
Fourth, "[w]hile unfair competition claims may provide compensation to
competitors harmed by false marking, only § 292 makes certain acts of
false marking criminal." 63 Furthermore, the penalty under § 292 may be
imposed only by a court of law, not by an administrative agency (such as
the USPTO).1 64 Finally, § 292 penalties do not compensate the government
for damages it suffered directly as a result of the defendant's alleged acts of
false marking, which further supports the punitive nature of this statute.1 65
Therefore, under the Supreme Court's tests, § 292 appears to impose a
criminal rather than a civil penalty. However, one cannot overlook the fact
that false-marking suits are nevertheless civil in form because they involve
only private litigants. 166 In considering the repercussions of imposing crim-
inal penalties in civil lawsuits, one court poetically summarized the prob-
lem by asking, "Is a wolf in sheep's clothing a wolf or a sheep?" 67 Perhaps
the best solution is to classify § 292 as a quasi-criminal provision, given its
hybrid nature. 168 This classification does not change the fact that the pre-
ponderance standard as applied to § 292 is unconstitutionally low. The
Supreme Court has held that "punishment cannot be imposed 'without due
process of law."'l 69 Because even a quasi-criminal statute is punitive, im-
position of its statutory penalty must comply with due process. The pre-
ponderance standard as applied to § 292 simply does not meet this
requirement.
160. See discussion supra Part II.A.
161. See 35 U.S.C. § 292; Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009);
Matthews, supra note 97.
162. Matthews, supra note 97; see also discussion supra Part I.D.
163. Matthews, supra note 97.
164. See id.
165. See Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 714, 728 (E.D. Va. 2009).
166. See Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("A qui tam action is
civil in form, even though it arises under a criminal statute.").
167. United States v. Shapleigh, 54 F. 126, 130 (8th Cir. 1893).
168. See Unique Product Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade Valve, Inc., No. 5:10-CV-1912, 2011 WL
924341, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 14, 2011) (noting that the government-which intervened as of right in
this case-referred to § 292 as a "civil-criminal hybrid"); see also Askanase, supra note 37, at 483
(calling the False Claims Act "a quasi-criminal statute hiding behind a civil mask").
169. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 186 (1963).
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B. Due Process Requirements
The Due Process Clause (DPC) of the Fifth Amendment states, "No
person shall.. . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." 70 This clause is "intended to secure the individual from
the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government." 71 Due process en-
compasses both substantive and procedural aspects. First, substantive due
process-which is not implicated by § 292-"bar[s] certain government
actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement
them," and thus "serves to prevent governmental power from being used
for purposes of oppression." 72 Second, procedural due process-the varie-
ty relevant here-acts as a "guarantee of fair procedure" that prevents the
government, inter alia, from "tak[ing] [a defendant's] property without
providing appropriate procedural safeguards."l 73 Procedural due process
"imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals
of 'liberty' or 'property' interests within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause." 74 Importantly, when a law violates procedural due process, "it is
not the deprivation of property or liberty [under the law] that is unconstitu-
tional; [rather] it is the deprivation of property or liberty without due
process of law-without adequate procedures."175
The Supreme Court put forth a three-factor analysis in Mathews v. El-
dridge for identifying the "specific dictates of [procedural] due process" in
a given legal context:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, in-
cluding the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 176
170. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause applies only to the federal
government. The Fourteenth Amendment also contains a Due Process Clause that applies to the States.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law"). As a federal statute, § 292 implicates the Fifth Amendment. Courts have
interpreted procedural due process requirements to be the same under both amendments. See Malinski
v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 415 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("To suppose that 'due process of
law' meant one thing in the Fifth Amendment and another in the Fourteenth is too frivolous to require
elaborate rejection."). Therefore, although some of the cases in this Part discuss due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the courts' reasoning applies with equal force to due process under the Fifth
Amendment.
171. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (quotation and citation omitted).
172. Id. (quotation and citation omitted).
173. Id. at 337 (Stevens, J., concurring).
174. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
175. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 339 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
176. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
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Applying this framework to the false-marking statute illustrates that a
higher burden of proof than a mere preponderance must be imposed on
§ 292 to satisfy due process requirements. 7 7 Each of the three Mathews
factors is discussed in turn below.
1. The Private Interests at Stake
The first Mathews factor looks to the private interests affected by the
official action.178 First, false-marking defendants have a property interest in
the money they stand to lose under § 292. The Supreme Court has empha-
sized that "the property interests protected by procedural due process ex-
tend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money,"l 79
which implicitly encompasses money as a protected property interest.180
Courts have also explicitly recognized money as a property interest under
the DPC.181 After Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co.-in which the Feder-
al Circuit held that the $500 penalty under § 292 applies on a per-article
basis-defendants stand to lose enormous sums of money if found liable
for falsely marking a large quantity of mass-produced products. 82
Second, false-marking defendants may possess a liberty interest in
preserving their professional reputations in order to ensure their ability to
garner future business. In Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, the
Supreme Court suggested that governmental action may implicate a pro-
tected liberty interest by imposing a stigma on one's "good name, reputa-
tion, honor, or integrity" that "foreclose[s] [one's] freedom to take
advantage of other employment opportunities."l 83 The Court clarified this
177. Cf LaSalle, supra note 126, at 518-33 (engaging in a comprehensive analysis of the Mathews
framework as applied to the False Claims Act and concluding that "the Due Process Clause demands a
greater degree of protection than that provided by setting the burden of proof at merely a preponderance
of the evidence," thereby advocating for the clear and convincing standard).
178. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
179. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972).
180. See Franken Invs., Inc. v. City of Flint, 218 F. Supp. 2d 876, 886 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
181. See Herrada v. City of Detroit, 275 F.3d 553, 556 (6th Cir. 2001) (property interest in money
paid for parking citations); Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1287 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Prisoners do have
a protected interest in their money, .. . [and] we must determine whether the process provided in the
statute satisfies the constitutional requirements of procedural due process."); Mahers v. Halford, 76 F.3d
951, 954 (8th Cir. 1996) ("We agree ... that inmates have a property interest in money received from
outside sources. . . . Thus, inmates are entitled to due process before they can be deprived of these
monies.").
182. See Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Pequig-
not v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1359 n.l (Fed. Cir. 2010).
183. Bd. Of Regents, 408 U.S.at 573-74 (in the context of government employment of a state
university professor); see also Pro-Mark, Inc. v. Kemp, 781 F. Supp. 1172, 1175 (S.D. Miss. 1991)
("[A] liberty interest would be implicated such as would trigger due process concerns if the suspension
[of a government contractor] were based on charges of fraud or dishonesty so as to impose a stigma
which foreclosed plaintiffs ability to obtain other contracts.").
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notion in Paul v. Davis by holding that although one's "interest in reputa-
tion [alone] ... is neither 'liberty' nor 'property' guaranteed against [go-
vernmental] deprivation without due process of law," due process
protections are implicated when one's reputation suffers from stigma
caused by governmental action and one's "[previously recognized] right or
status . . . [is] distinctly altered or extinguished." 84 This has become
known as the "stigma-plus test."1 85 Some courts have interpreted Roth and
Davis-at least in the government-employment context-to mean that an
employee's liberty interest in "purs[ing] the occupation of his choice" may
be infringed when a government-employer's termination of the employee
somehow publicly "stigmatize[s]" the latter, thereby causing the employee
to "suffer[] a tangible loss of other employment opportunities."l 86
In the false-marking context, defendants facing § 292 claims stand to
have their professional reputations significantly damaged by the stigma that
attaches through false-marking liability. 187 As a result of this stigma, a
false-marking defendant's ability to secure future business could be jeopar-
dized, especially if the public learns of the defendant's false-marking activ-
ity and thereafter boycotts the defendant's products. 88 This situation is
analogous to that described above where the government terminates an
employee in a publicly stigmatizing fashion and thereby interferes with the
latter's liberty to "pursue the occupation of his choice."l 89 In both situa-
tions, the government's actions negatively impact the public's perception
of the stigmatized party, thereby endangering the latter's opportunity to
pursue desired employment or business prospects. Accordingly, false-
marking defendants arguably hold a protected liberty interest in their busi-
ness reputations. 190
2. Insufficiency of Existing Procedures and Proposed Alternative Proce-
dures
The second Mathews factor addresses the sufficiency of current pro-
cedures and the benefit of alternative procedural safeguards. 191 Here, the
184. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976).
185. See Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006).
186. Townsend v. Vallas, 256 F.3d 661, 669-70 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Baar v. Jefferson Cnty.
Bd. of Educ., 311 F.App'x 817, 826 (6th Cir. 2009).
187. See discussion supra Part 1II.B.3.
188. See id.
189. See Townsend, 256 F.3d at 669-70.
190. Cf LaSalle, supra note 126, at 525-26 (arguing that the interests at stake for defendants sued
under the False Claims Act include reputational harm and monetary loss).
191. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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only contested aspect of existing procedures is application of the prepon-
derance standard to § 292 claims. As previously discussed, courts generally
apply the preponderance standard in civil disputes for which society has the
least concern for the outcome and feels comfortable allocating the risk of
error equally among the litigants.192 In light of this observation, the pre-
ponderance standard is inappropriate as applied to § 292. More specifically,
the mandatory rebuttable presumption of intent under § 292-which arises
once a plaintiff has shown that the defendant's product was falsely marked
and that the defendant knew the marking was false-should rest on a great-
er evidentiary showing than a mere preponderance.1 93 First, § 292 is at
minimum a quasi-criminal, punitive provision, which renders false-marking
litigation quite unlike typical civil disputes.194 Second, given that § 292 is a
quasi-criminal provision, society demands greater assurance than the pre-
ponderance standard can provide that false-marking defendants have not
wrongfully been found liable. Finally, the risk of error in a false-marking
suit should not be allocated equally among the litigants because the inter-
ests as stake for the defendant are much more significant than those of the
qui tam plaintiff, particularly when the latter has suffered no competitive
injury (as is usually the case) and seeks only financial gain.195
As an alternative procedure, courts should require false-marking plain-
tiffs to prove the elements of § 292 claims by clear and convincing evi-
192. See discussion supra Part I.E.I.
193. See Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1362-64 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (discussing rebutta-
ble presumption of intent to deceive the public). As a threshold matter, it is unclear whether the Federal
Circuit intended for this presumption to be treated as a civil or a criminal one. On the one hand, when
the Federal Circuit first fashioned the presumption in Pequignot, the court seemingly viewed it as
criminal, as evidenced by the court's citation to Sandstrom v. Montana for the proposition that a "con-
clusive presumption regarding intent in the criminal context [would be] unconstitutional" and its state-
ment that § 292 is a "criminal statute." Id. at 1363. In the criminal context, mandatory presumptions-
even rebuttable ones-that shift the burden of persuasion on the element of intent to defendants are
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause because they relieve the government of the burden of
persuasion on a key element of the offense. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 317 (1985). On the
other hand, the Pequignot court also asserted that "[a § 292] qui tam action is civil in form, even though
it arises under a criminal statute" and applied the preponderance standard to the presumption, thereby
suggesting that the presumption is a civil one. Pequignot, 608 F.3d at 1363-64. Civil presumptions are
governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 301, which states:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by these
rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going
forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the
burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial
upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
FED. R. EVID. 301. This discussion is admittedly cursory because a full analysis of the issue is beyond
the scope of this note.
194. See discussion supra Part W.A.
195. See Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 619 F.3d 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that qui tam
plaintiff who had suffered no competitive injury nevertheless had Article III standing to sue under
§ 292); Mullin, supra note 8.
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dence.196 Furthermore, the rebuttable presumption of intent to deceive
should not arise unless a plaintiff has shown the predicate facts by clear and
convincing evidence. This standard is preferable because: it allocates a
greater risk of error to the qui tam plaintiffs whose interests are less signifi-
cant than those of the defendants; 197 it better reflects society's level of con-
cern that false-marking defendants not be erroneously found liable for a
quasi-criminal act; 198 and it offers greater protection against the probable
reputational harm faced by false-marking defendants. 199 Furthermore, ap-
plying the clear and convincing standard to § 292 would better ensure that
penalties are imposed against only those defendants who actually engaged
in the egregious practices § 292 seeks to deter. Nevertheless, the burden on
defendants to rebut the presumption of intent (by showing that they did not
act with a deceptive purpose) should remain preponderance of the evi-
dence.200 There is no reason why defendants should face a higher hurdle
than they already do for proving that their false-marking activities resulted
from legitimate business decisions.
3. The Government's Interests
The final Mathews factor examines any additional fiscal and adminis-
trative burdens the proposed alternative procedural safeguards would im-
pose on the government. 201 Because false marking harms the public, the
government has a legitimate interest in deterring the practice and seeing
that those who falsely mark their products are appropriately punished.202
However, requiring plaintiffs to prove false-marking claims under § 292 by
clear and convincing evidence-rather than by a mere preponderance-will
not negatively impact the government's interest. In fact, elevating the bur-
den of proof may actually benefit the government. First, although qui tam
plaintiffs facing an elevated burden will likely have to expend greater re-
sources to investigate their cases than they otherwise would if the prepon-
196. Cf LaSalle, supra note 126, at 531 (advancing the same argument with respect to the False
Claims Act).
197. See discussion supra Part I.E.2.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that false-
marking defendants must "show by a preponderance of the evidence that [they] did not have the requi-
site purpose to deceive" in order to rebut the presumption of intent under § 292).
201. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
202. See discussion supra Part I.D.
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derance standard applied, 203 this extra cost will be imposed on the plain-
tiffs, themselves, and not on the government. Accordingly, wealth-seeking
qui tam plaintiffs who have suffered no competitive injury may be deterred
from bringing frivolous lawsuits under § 292, which would in turn con-
serve judicial resources for legitimate false-marking cases.204 Second, the
government has an interest in ensuring that only those defendants who
acted with intent to deceive the public are penalized under the statute in
order to instill public confidence in the just operation of the government's
laws and to enhance the statute's deterrent effect. The clear and convincing
standard is better able to achieve this objective than the less stringent pre-
ponderance standard.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit's liberal treatment of 35 U.S.C. § 292 has created
a climate in which opportunistic qui tam plaintiffs facing a low burden of
proof can recover potentially enormous sums of money under the statute
with no showing of competitive injury. Not only have the court's decisions
surrounding § 292 given rise to a "'cottage industry' of false-marking liti-
gation," 205 but they have also put false-marking defendants' property and
liberty interests at stake without sufficient procedural safeguards in place to
prevent erroneous deprivations.
One way to remedy this procedural deficiency and to bring the false-
marking statute back into equilibrium with its intended purpose in society
would be to raise the burden of proof for false-marking claims from a mere
preponderance to clear and convincing evidence. Not only is this elevated
burden supported by policy reasons and lessons gleaned from analogous
legal contexts, but it is also required by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. If the Federal Circuit fails to correct its own error in setting
the burden of proof for § 292 claims too low, Congress ought to step in and
rectify the situation itself.206
203. Cf LaSalle, supra note 126, at 532 (acknowledging that applying the clear and convincing
standard to the False Claims Act instead of the preponderance standard would require "cases ... to be
investigated in greater depth, and therefore at greater expense").
204. See Roberts, supra note 77, at 274 (arguing that false-marking plaintiffs facing a higher bur-
den of proof-namely, beyond a reasonable doubt-were "dissuade[d] . .. from undertaking the ex-
pense and trouble of litigation merely for the sake of plunder").
205. Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("[The accused false
marker in this case] argues that interpreting the fine of § 292 to apply on a per article basis would
encourage 'a new cottage industry' of false marking litigation by plaintiffs who have not suffered any
direct harm."). Apparently, this prediction has come true.
206. In the past year, Congress has taken steps toward correcting the current false-marking situa-
tion, but its focus has been on reducing the possible damages under § 292 and limiting standing to
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plaintiffs who have suffered competitive injury. See H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 16(b) (2011) (requiring
competitive injury for standing under § 292 and limiting damages to those "adequate to compensate for
the injury"); S. 23, 112th Cong. § 2(k) (2011) (requiring the same). As of yet, Congress has not pro-
posed raising the burden of proof for false-marking claims.
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